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 Chasing Cost Control and 
Increased Quality through 
“New and Improved” 
Payment Incentives 
Rick Mayes and Jessica Walradt
Abstract
Pay-for-performance (P4P) reimbursement has become 
a popular and growing form of health care payment 
built on the belief that payment incentives strongly 
affect medical providers’ behavior. By paying more to 
those providers who are deemed to deliver better care, 
the goal is to increase quality and, hopefully, restrain 
cost growth. This article provides a brief explanation 
of: (1) how previous P4P plans in the U.S. have fared, 
along with their special relationship to primary care, 
and (2) how England’s experience with P4P and newer 
versions of these kinds of plans being pursued in places 
such as Massachusetts might provide valuable case 
studies for how the U.S. and other countries can achieve 
meaningful reform of health care organization, delivery 
and fi nance.
Background, Performance of Early Plans, 
and Primary Care
P4P fi nancially rewards medical providers who achieve, 
improve upon or exceed performance goals on specifi ed 
quality benchmarks. It has developed largely in response 
to the cost control problems and perverse incentives 
associated with fee-for-service reimbursement, which 
is the dominant model in the U.S.1 Instead of simply 
reimbursing providers more for greater volume and 
intensity of care, P4P pays more to providers whose care 
is deemed to be of higher (or suffi ciently high) quality.2 
These plans are intended to lower health care costs over 
the long term by increasing preventative care, primary 
care and the improved treatment of conditions at earlier 
stages of development.3 Most P4P approaches adjust 
payments to hospitals, individual physicians, networks 
of physicians or medical practice groups in one of three 
ways: (1) a bonus payment based on a percentage of 
all care delivered by a provider, (2) a bonus payment 
per patient member for a provider that has delivered 
what pre-determined measures would deem as “high 
quality” care, or (3) as a percentage of the total cost 
savings achieved relative to what costs would have been 
without achieving higher quality.4 
The fi rst generation of P4P plans that proliferated 
from the early to mid-2000s in the U.S. proved mostly 
ineffective in either increasing quality or controlling 
costs.5 The bonus payments were arguably too small and 
the areas of clinical quality too narrow to foster signifi cant 
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behavioral change on the part of providers.6 Moreover, 
complex patients with multiple medical problems posed 
unique dilemmas for physicians when their complicated 
conditions did not fi t neatly within individual care 
guidelines,7 and their care was (often minimally) 
coordinated among different clinicians.8 Concerns 
emerged that “the methods used to measure the quality 
of care unfairly penalized providers caring for patients 
with multiple chronic conditions.”9 Studies found that 
some P4P plans did actually worsen existing disparities 
by discouraging physicians from caring for poorer, less 
The reality in health care is that 
there are no fundamentally 
“new” methods of health care 
payment. Ultimately, P4P and 
other alternative approaches are 
newly blended combinations of old 
models – fee-for-service, salary, 
and capitation – each of which has 
its own strengths and weaknesses.
compliant patients.10 In short, some providers began 
“cherry picking”11 to avoid those potential patients who 
they perceived were likely to lower their overall quality 
scores.12 One of the most prevalent changes associated 
with the early P4P plans was increased documentation.13 
In other words, rather than increases in quality and use 
of preventive services, early P4P plans generated more 
record-keeping. “If pay for performance was a therapy,” 
an observer noted in 2007, “its rapid diffusion thus far 
would have to be considered premature.”14
One of the areas that P4P supporters have most hoped 
would benefi t from this new form of payment is primary 
care.15 Fee-for-service reimbursement has traditionally 
disadvantaged primary care by overpaying for procedures 
and intensity of care,16 while underpaying for evaluation 
and management services that require physicians 
to spend time diagnosing and coordinating patients’ 
care.17 This underpayment has led many primary care 
physicians to feel like “hamsters on a treadmill,” seeing 
more and more patients to make up for reimbursements 
that do not keep up with their practice expenses.18 
Rather than focusing on increased volume (more offi ce 
visits) to remain fi nancially solvent, P4P advocates 
have suggested that primary care physicians could earn 
more by focusing on increased quality and the resulting 
bonus payments they receive.19 Yet the problem that 
has emerged with this approach is that the far larger, 
underlying payment model that still drives the bulk of 
providers’ behavior remains fee-for-service.20 And P4P 
does nothing to address the over-supply of unnecessary 
medical care.21 In short, P4P (based on quality) and 
fee-for-service (based on volume and intensity) do not 
naturally or easily complement one another in actual 
practice.22 
England, Massachusetts, and the 
Inability of Payment Reform Alone to 
Reform Health Care
England’s experience with P4P and primary care, 
therefore, ought to provide an illuminating contrast.23 
If the problem of adding quality payment incentives to 
physicians’ reimbursement in the U.S. has been that 
these payments have generally been too small, too 
narrow clinically, and overwhelmed by the incentives 
within the dominant fee-for-service model still in place, 
then P4P in England should potentially show greater 
results. Its primary care physicians are salaried within a 
national health system that rewards them with quality-
based bonuses equal to as much as 25-30 per cent of 
their total income.24 Introduced in England in 2004 
as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), the 
new payment scheme included 136 quality indicators 
covering the management of chronic disease, practice 
organization, and patients’ care experiences.25 One year 
after the QOF’s inception, the rate of improvement in 
quality of care for such conditions as asthma and diabetes 
increased.26 While the care associated with heart disease 
did not initially experience this success, by 2007, “the 
rate for all three conditions had slowed, and the quality 
of those aspects of care that were not associated with 
an incentive had declined for patients with asthma or 
heart disease.”27 Continuity of care also declined after 
the scheme began operation. Apparently, once quality 
targets were reached, “the improvement in the quality 
of care for patients with these conditions slowed, and 
the quality of care declined for two conditions that had 
not been linked to incentives.”28 
The reality in health care is that there are no 
fundamentally “new” methods of health care payment.29 
Ultimately, P4P and other alternative approaches are 
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newly blended combinations of old models – fee-for-
service, salary, and capitation – each of which has its 
own strengths and weaknesses.30 And payment reform 
alone cannot correct the deeply fragmented, ineffi cient 
and costly U.S. health care system.31 As Atul Gawande 
noted in his infl uential 2009 New Yorker article, “The 
Cost Conundrum,”32 read by President Barack Obama 
and shared with his White House staff,33 achieving 
high quality, affordable, integrated health care with 
an abundance of health promotion and prevention 
is invariably achieved by changing the overall culture 
of medicine to make it more like organizations such 
as the Mayo Clinic, Geisinger Health System, and 
Intermountain Healthcare.34 Before this kind of cultural 
transformation can occur and costs can be brought 
under greater control, however, payment reform is a 
good and arguably necessary place to start.35
The U.S. state leading the charge in payment reform by 
trying to end fee-for-service medicine is Massachusetts.36 
After achieving near-universal coverage with the passage 
of ambitious health insurance reforms in 2006, the state 
embarked on the subsequent and more challenging 
goal of cost control.37 It has no choice.38 Massachusetts 
now spends 33 per cent more per person than the U.S. 
average and the state’s increasingly expensive universal 
health plan has necessitated new taxes and fees to 
stabilize its fi nances.39 A special commission established 
to fi nd ways to control cost growth wants to replace fee-
for-service reimbursement to individual providers with 
payments for entire episodes of patient care made to 
groups of clinicians (“accountable care organizations,” 
or ACOs) who emphasize primary care and would 
together take responsibility for a patient’s health.40 
Moving to this capitation payment model,41 whereby an 
ACO receives a fi xed or “capitated” amount of money per 
patient member per month – adjusted for the member’s 
health status and with built-in bonuses for achieving 
higher quality outcomes – would be a dramatic departure 
from the status quo.42 It would encourage two behaviors 
that fee-for-service tends to discourage: “collaboration 
of physicians, hospitals, and other providers involved in 
a patient’s care; and active efforts to reduce avoidable 
complications of care (and the costs associated with 
them).”43 Moreover, “it accomplishes these goals by 
paying for all the care a patient needs over the course of 
a defi ned clinical episode or a set period of management 
of a chronic condition,” rather than paying for individual 
medical services.44 
The political stakes for this model of payment reform 
are high.45 The landmark Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, signed into U.S. law by President Obama in 
March of 2010, established a program for expanding 
ACOs by January 2012.46 The hope is to begin moving 
the biggest U.S. federal health insurance program, 
Medicare, away from fee-for-service reimbursement47 
and toward a global payment model that will encourage 
more holistic and integrated care,48 especially for its most 
expensive patients with multiple chronic conditions.49 
As its previous experiments with payment reform 
have demonstrated,50 Medicare is the nation’s most 
infl uential payer and, thus, directly and indirectly drives 
the behavior of all other stakeholders in U.S. health care 
system.51 Where it leads, others inevitably follow.52
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